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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Caleb Michael Leonard appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence following his conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (cocaine).

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Leonard with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent
to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.71-72.) Leonard filed a Motion to
Suppress (R., pp.64-65), claiming "the warrantless stop by the officers was unlawful and without
legal justification, therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment" (id., p.64). At the end of the
suppression hearing in which the parties relied solely upon testimony presented by Deputy Sheriff
Jeremy Hyle at the preliminary hearing, the district court summarized the underlying facts and its
relevant legal conclusions as follows:
On January 20th, Deputy Hyle was on patrol on Interstate 90 heading east,
and according to his testimony ... he stated, "That a vehicle was in front of us as
we were driving east on 1-90 and I had our vehicle set at 65 mile [sic] an hour. The
vehicle in front of us was pulling away to an extent that I believe it was traveling
approximately 70 mile [sic] an hour."
The Deputy went on to state, "When I turned my radar on to see if he could
verify the speed of the vehicle, it hit the brakes and slowed down."
Further on in the Deputy's testimony, he states that, "We saw the vehicle
with its right side tires cross the fog line on the right side of the road two times, I
believe."
The Deputy turned on his overhead lights and eventually effectuated a
traffic stop. And during the traffic stop, there wasn't any discussion of speeding.
The Deputy did not advise Mr. Leonard or the passenger regarding his observations
as to the speeding of the vehicle. And on Page 13 of the preliminary hearing
transcript, he explained why. He says, "My discretion was that the vehicle leaving
its lane of travel was a bigger safety concern."
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The defense is arguing that there is insufficient evidence factually to
establish that the vehicle being driven by Mr. Leonard had its tires completely cross
over the fog line. The defense contends that there is insufficient evidence to
establish that the vehicle was speeding and alternatively if it was speeding, that the
State or the Officer abandoned that claim by not bringing it up.
This becomes a question of fact. The video in this case does not capture
every observation that the Officer may have made, particularly with regard to
alleged speeding. What I do have is sworn testimony under oath from an
experienced deputy indicating that in his opinion a vehicle was pulling away from
him while he was going 65 miles an hour. When he attempted to verify that, the
vehicle hit the brakes and slowed down. As a result of that, the Officer continued
to follow the vehicle.
....
. . . He’s set his speed at 65 miles an hour and something’s pulling away
from him. He can’t tell exactly how much the speed is exceeding 65 miles an hour
and before he can verify it, the person recognizes or may have recognized, we never
know for sure, that there was a police officer behind him and backs off the speed.
Pretty common. But it doesn’t change the fact the Deputy observed a violation of
the Idaho Code for exceeding the posted speed limit of 65 miles an hour.
There is no legal requirement that a police officer immediately pull over
someone when they see a law violation relating to a vehicle. . . . In this case the
Deputy observed the speeding, did not choose to immediately turn on his lights and
effect a traffic stop but did choose to follow the vehicle for a certain distance.
According to the preliminary hearing transcript, the video doesn’t really go
on until the Officer’s lights turn on and that may have been far before – or far after,
excuse me, the Deputy observed the speeding violation. And even if the video goes
back 30 seconds from when the overhead lights go on, it does not seem improbable
at all that it was not captured on the video.
Having reviewed the video and compared it to the Officer’s testimony, the
Officer’s sworn testimony was that the vehicle’s tires on the right side crossed over
the fog line on the road. The video is taken at night. It is taken from some distance
away. And it may or may not have actually captured what the Deputy said that he
saw. Because again, the video only goes back 40 seconds from when he turned on
his lights, and I cannot conclude that the Deputy’s sworn testimony is sufficiently
contradicted or impeached by the lack of a videotape capturing the alleged fog line
violation.
In order for the stop of a vehicle to be valid, an officer has to be able to
articulate specific facts that a vehicle has been or is about to be driven in violation
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0f the trafﬁc code. That must be based on the
inferences t0 be

totality

drawn by those circumstances.

.

.

of the circumstances and any

.

Here the Ofﬁcer articulated that he observed the vehicle exceeding the
posted speed limit 0f 65 miles an hour. The Ofﬁcer also articulated that he observed
the vehicle drive outside 0f the marked lane of travel by crossing the fog lines. I
ﬁnd that those two bases have been established by speciﬁc facts and they provide
a reasonable articulable suspicion for the Deputy to have stopped the vehicle being
driven by Mr. Leonard.

Having concluded

that the stop

of the vehicle was lawful, the defense

is

arguing that the stop was unlawfully extended by the actions of the ofﬁcers and that
the evidence that they ultimately seized from the vehicle should be suppressed.

In this case, the Ofﬁcers, as allowed

by law, stopped

the vehicle and

inquired of the driver regarding driver’s license, registration,
insurance.

The

typical information that

is

requested

Ofﬁcers, quite politely, engaged in what

I

would

at

and proof 0f

a trafﬁc stop.

call

brief and not intrusive at

The defendant was able

the

small talk regarding

destination and purpose of the trip that the defendant and his passenger

The questions were

Then

were on.

all.

produce his information and there was a delay in
producing a valid insurance certiﬁcate. The passenger [Kayla Echeverry] was in
t0

possession of or was providing the insurance certiﬁcate and provided one that was
expired and the Deputy gave the passenger the opportunity to look for another one
0r t0 even get

some conﬁrmation 0f proof 0f insurance through her telephone.

A11 ofthis quite naturally prolonged the stop and

it

was during this particular

delay that the Deputy smelled the distinct odor 0f marijuana in his opinion. And
you can plainly see on the Video that he signaled his partner by looking — lifting his
head up and looking over at his partner pointing t0 his nose.
.

At

.

.

based 0n his training and experience,
another reason to continue his investigation”
that point, the Ofﬁcer,

1

now

has

During the subsequent search of the vehicle, Deputy Hyle found and seized two baggies from
had a White residue and the other had “a large amount of white powder
substance” which, according to an I.S.P. Forensic Controlled Substance Analysis Report,
contained 12.45 grams 0f cocaine (including the plastic bag). (2/23/17 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-23; St. EX.
1
Conf. Docs. Appeal Volume 1.pdf, pp.46-47).)

the center console; one

(ﬂ

3

That happens in police work. The Officer stopped the vehicle for the lane
violation, had observed a speeding violation earlier, and now has the smell of
marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Everybody at this point is being very
cooperative. . . . They’re talking . . . while the information that has been presented
to the Deputy is being verified back in his patrol car.
Once all of that was done and the Deputy advised that he was not going to
be writing a ticket for the lane violation, that he was simply gonna give a warning,
the Deputy brings up the question of when did – to the defendant, “When did you
last smoke marijuana?” And the defendant was candid, indicating that he had
earlier in the day I believe was his answer or sometime prior. And then there was
a fairly candid discussion at that point, a brief discussion, and then the Deputy
inquired about, ‘Are there any drugs in the car or anything else he needed to know
about.’ Are there any drugs in the car or anything else he needed to know about.’
And from that point on the Deputy had already developed probable cause to search
the vehicle when he smelled the marijuana and testified about its odor and he could
detain the defendant and the passenger. He did not unlawfully extend the detention.
....
The observation or the smell was obtained by the Deputy in a place where
he had the right to be and just because he was standing near the vehicle or outside
the vehicle talking to the passengers, there’s no unlawful police activity in that
smell if you will. And once the Deputy had that, there was no reason, I mean he
didn’t have to go too much farther as far as justifying the search of the vehicle.
....
But in this case I find that based on the totality of the circumstances that
there was not any unlawful delay in the traffic stop and that during the delay caused
by the passenger’s inability to provide the current proof of insurance and verify
that, that that’s when the plain smell observation was made giving the Deputy
probable cause to search the vehicle.
For those reasons, I will find the defendant has not met their burden on
establishing that the State did not have reasonable articulable suspicion, that the
vehicle was being driven contrary to the traffic laws in Idaho, and that the stop of
the vehicle was therefore lawful in compliance with the Fourth Amendment and
with the provisions of the Idaho Constitution.
Additionally, I will find that the defendant has not established that the
lawful stop was unlawfully detained – extended or prolonged by the action of the
State and that, therefore, the Motion to Suppress is denied.
(8/15/17 Tr., p.23, L.16 – p.33, L.15 (emphases and explanation added).)
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After Leonard’s Motion to Suppress was denied (R., pp.117-118), pursuant to a plea
agreement preserving his right to appeal the suppression order, he entered a conditional plea to
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) and the paraphernalia charge was dismissed (R.,
pp.119-126).

The district court withheld judgment for two years, and placed Leonard on

supervised probation for that same period. (R., pp.127-136.) Leonard timely appealed from the
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.137-140.)
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ISSUE
Leonard

Did the

states the issue

district court err

0n appeal

when

it

as:

denied Mr. Leonard’s motion to suppress because

crossing the fog line did not provide Deputy Hyle With reasonable suspicion to

make

the trafﬁc stop, and

Deputy Hyle’s abandonment of the alleged speeding

Violation unlawfully prolonged the stop?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Leonard

failed t0

show

the district court erred in denying his motion t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
Leonard Has Failed T0 Show The
A.

District

Court Erred In Denying His Motion To Suppress

Introduction

Leonard argues on appeal

denying his motion t0 suppress.

that the district court erred in

While he concedes the stop of his vehicle due

t0 speeding

was supported by reasonable

suspicion,

he argues, “mindful that Deputy Hyle smelled marijuana prior t0 the owner 0f the car providing
proof 0f insurance, Mr. Leonard asserts that Deputy Hyle’s afﬁrmative statement to Mr. Leonard
about

Why

he pulled him over

[for crossing

over the fog

make

the stop based

proved he abandoned the only

While Deputy Hyle

potentially legitimate purpose for the stop.[2]

suspicion t0

line]

on the speeding

Violation,

may have had

reasonable

he abandoned that basis t0 pursue the

fog line issue only.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.11 (explanation added).)

Leonard

fails to

show that Deputy Hyle abandoned the “speeding”

basis for the trafﬁc stop

merely because he believed Leonard’s improper lane travel was “a bigger safety concern” and
chose t0 discuss that matter With Leonard.

(2/23/17 Tr., p.13, L.24

—

p.14, L.5.)

There

is

n0

evidence that Deputy Hyle abandoned his investigation into Leonard’s speeding before he smelled
the odor of marijuana

search

coming from

it.

Although the Nial and
travel for purposes

inside Leonard’s vehicle, giving the ofﬁcer probable cause t0

m

0f Idaho Code

§

49-6370)

determinative here. Because Leonard

totality

2

decisions

make

clear that fog lines

(failure to

do not deﬁne lanes of

maintain lane), those decisions are not

was speeding and drove over

the fog line twice, under the

of those circumstances, Deputy Hyle had reasonable suspicion (0r grounds) t0 stop

Leonard contends

that driving onto 0r over a fog line cannot provide

ﬂ

an ofﬁcer with reasonable

State V. Neal, 159 Idaho 439,
grounds t0 conduct a trafﬁc stop. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-1 1);
362 P.3d 514 (2015); State V. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 416 P.3d 957 (2018).
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Leonard’s vehicle in order t0 investigate his overall driving — regardless of whether there was a
lane infraction.

Standard

B.

Of Review

On review 0f a ruling 0n a motion t0

suppress, the appellate court defers to the

trial

court’s

ﬁndings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial court’s determination
as to

Whether constitutional standards have been satisﬁed in

147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State

309 (2004).
not be

If ﬁndings are supported

deemed

by

light

0f the

V. Fees,

facts. State V.

Willoughby,

140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306,

substantial evidence in the record, those “[f]indings will

clearly erroneous.” State V. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct.

App. 2008) (quoting State

V. Jaborra,

143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

Deputy Hvle Did Not Abandon The “Speeding” Basis For The Trafﬁc Stop

C.

“Because a routine trafﬁc stop

is

normally limited in scope and of short duration,

analogous t0 an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore
principles set forth in Terry

m,

v.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

1,

139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223

an ofﬁcer

may

88

S. Ct.

(Ct.

is

it is

more

m

analyzed under the

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).”

App. 2003). “Under the Fourth Amendment,

stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there

articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary t0 trafﬁc laws.”

Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004).

is

a reasonable and

State V. Roe, 140

“[W]hen an ofﬁcer has an objectively

reasonable basis for making an investigative stop, the ofﬁcer’s subj ective motive or actual state 0f

mind

is

irrelevant”; consequently,

Where a stop

is

justiﬁed by an “objectively reasonable basis,”

such as an observed trafﬁc Violation, “any underlying motive

.

..

in stopping [a defendant’s] vehicle

as a pretext to search for drugs” is irrelevant.

455

(Ct.

investigative detention

effectuate the purpose 0f the stop.”

S. Ct.

is

must be temporary and

last

no longer than necessary

State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261,

“Because addressing the infraction

App. 2008).

longer than

135

798 P.2d 453,

App. 1990).

“An

(Ct.

State V. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610,

is

the purpose of the stop,

necessary t0 effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez

V.

United States,

it

may

_

1264

last

U.S.

t0

n0

_,

1609, 1616 (2015) (internal quotes, brackets and citations omitted). “The stop remains

a reasonable seizure While the ofﬁcer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, t0 Which that

reasonable suspicion

is related.

However, should the ofﬁcer abandon the purpose of the

ofﬁcer n0 longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions.” State

stop, the

V.

Linze,

161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).

The United

States

Supreme Court has held

that,

“[b]ey0nd determining Whether t0 issue a

trafﬁc ticket, an ofﬁcer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident t0 [the trafﬁc] stop.”’

Rodriguez, 135

S. Ct. at

1615 (quoting

Illinois V. Caballes,

543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). “Typically

such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining Whether there are outstanding
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”

Li.

“These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the trafﬁc code: ensuring that

vehicles 0n the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Li.

The

district court

acknowledged

that

Leonard argued

“speeding” purpose for the trafﬁc stop (8/15/17

on that point

(ﬂ generally

id.,

p.22, L.13

T11, p.24, Ls.

— p.34,

1

that

Deputy Hyle abandoned the

8-22), but

it

did not speciﬁcally rule

L.3). Nonetheless, the court’s

acknowledgment

0f the issue and denial 0f Leonard’s suppression motion sufﬁces as a rejection of that argument.

E

Herman ex

rel.

Herman

V.

Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 786, 41 P.3d 209, 214 (2002) (“In

unconditionally granting defendant’s motion for
ruled against Matthew’s argument

(Ct.

.

.

.

.”);

App. 2005) (“While the court does not

made.”).

The

summary judgment,

the district court implicitly

Lester V. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937, 941, 120 P.3d 755

explicitly state

its

ﬁnding,

district court correctly, albeit implicitly, rejected

.

.

.

the

ﬁnding was implicitly

Leonard’s argument that the

purpose of the stop for speeding was abandoned prior t0 the ofﬁcer’s olfactory detection 0f
marijuana.

In this case, there

was an

travelling at the exact speed limit

vehicle pulling

away from him

objectively reasonable basis for the stop:
--

--

a veriﬁed 65 miles per hour

in front

of him. The deputy testiﬁed

Deputy Hyle was

When he observed Leonard’s
at the

preliminary hearing:

ofus as we were driving east on 1-90, and I had our
vehicle set at 65 mile[s] an hour, and the vehicle in front of us was pulling away to
an extent that I believe it was traveling approximately 70 mile[s] an hour.

The vehicle was

in front

car, one’s digital and one’s
in
vehicle and the radar, and
our
have
we
each 0f those was showing our vehicle speed at 65 mile[s] an hour.

There are two speedometers on the dash of the

the regular dial, as well as the

CPS

that

(2/23/17 TL, p.8, Ls.4-15 (emphasis added).)
“the reason for the stop

was

When the

deputy was asked

the speed,” he answered, “[y]es.”

if he

had testiﬁed

(2/23/17 Tr., p.43, L.25

—

that

p.44,

L.2.)

During the trafﬁc

stop,

Deputy Hyle did not ask Leonard any questions about speeding.

(2/23/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.20-22.) Instead, he questioned Leonard about his staying inside the fog line

(0r, as the

ofﬁcer believed, lane of travel) because

lane 0f travel

is

it

“was a bigger safety concern,

one 0f the top reasons, according t0 the national

and he “couldn’t verify an exact speed

t0 tell

them

at

causing crashes,”

which they were speeding other than

they were going faster than 65 mile[s] an hour.” (2/23/17

10

statistics, for

as leaving the

Tr., p.13,

that

L.23 — p.14, L.5.) However,

the deputy did not, as Leonard claims,

abandon the “speeding” basis

for the stop

questions about his driving 0n, and over, the fog line 0n a Winter night3
side 0f the road

(citation

it

and guardrail.

E

State V. Hays, 159 Idaho 476,

and quotations omitted) (questioning unrelated

t0

merely by asking

when snow was on

362 P.3d 551

(Ct.

the

App. 2015)

purpose 0f stop appropriate so long as

does not “measurably extend the duration 0f the stop”); State

V.

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496,

198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (observations during encounter may give rise to other legitimate
areas 0f inquiry and investigation).

The record does not support Leonard’s claim that Deputy Hyle

abandoned the “speeding” purpose of the stop before developing probable cause
vehicle

upon smelling marijuana coming from

489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing

Deen V.

inside

it.

State, 131

E

State V. Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482,

Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998))

(Whether an ofﬁcer has reasonable suspicion to detain a suspect

on the

to search the

is

an objective

test

not dependent

subj ective beliefs 0f an individual ofﬁcer.)

The evidence

also

shows

that

Deputy Hyle continued

t0

engage in tasks consistent with a

standard trafﬁc stop by, in sequence, obtaining Leonard’s driver’s license, Ms. (Echeverry)

Laursen’s vehicle registration, and attempting t0 obtain her proof 0f insurance. (2/23/ 17 TL, p.16,
L.3

—

p.17, L.3.)

It

was “[w]hile [Deputy Hyle] was waiting

insurance, [that he] smelled the odor of marijuana

for her to

show [him] her proof of

coming from the vehicle.” (2/23/17

Tr., p.17,

Ls.23-25 (explanation added).) A11 0f Deputy Hyle’s actions leading up t0 the discovery 0f the

odor of marijuana were appropriate actions during a trafﬁc

stop.

E

Rodriguez, 135

S. Ct. at

1615.

3

E ﬂ
St.

EX. 2, 00:00—01 :00, Unassigned_20170120_1 1_13_UC2_DrugSeizure_47308163.ts,

Camera 0;
alﬂ 2/23/17 Tr., p.33, L.15 — p.35, L.24; p.70, L.5 — p.72, L.21; 8/15/17 Tr., p3,
L. 1 6 — p.4, L.11 (path of admission ofthe front dash cam Video 0f Leonard’s vehicle up t0 the time
0f the

stop).)
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D.

Deputy Hvle’s Testimony That Leonard’s Vehicle Crossed The Fog Line Twice Was Part
Of The Totalitv Of Circumstances Relevant T0 Show Ofﬁcer Hvle Had A Reasonable,
Articulable Suspicion T0 Conduct A Trafﬁc Stop

The

second basis for ﬁnding Deputy Hyle had reasonable suspicion t0

district court’s

conduct a trafﬁc stop was the deputy’s testimony that he “saw the vehicle with
cross the fog line

on the

right side

m

right side tires

of the road two times[.]” (2/23/17

Tr., p.9,

Ls.18-24; p.66,

Leonard correctly

cites the

Idaho Supreme

Ls.11-16; 8/15/17 Tr., p.24, Ls.2-5; p.28, Ls.4-10.)
Court’s decision in

its

for the proposition that “crossing or touching a fog line does not provide

an ofﬁcer with reasonable suspicion that a trafﬁc Violation has been committed.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p. 10.)

Based 0n

that concept,

Leonard contends

that “the district court erred in holding that

crossing the fog line contributed t0 the totality 0f circumstances, Which provided Deputy Hyle

With reasonable suspicion t0 stop Mr. Leonard.”

(Id.

not supply the blanket rule suggested

the Idaho

Neal was unequivocally

by Leonard;

(emphasis added).) However,

m

Supreme Court explained:

clear that an isolated incident 0f touching the fog line does

not Violate section 49-637(1).

And given that the

fog line does not signify a formal

lane barrier, an isolated incident 0f temporarily crossing the fog line likewise does

not Violate section 49-637(1).

.

.

.

We reiterate the rule recently pronounced in Neal by emphasizing that the
fog

line, if present,

does not serve t0 demarcate the boundary 0f the lane 0f travel.

If present, the fog line serves as a point

drivers’ safety. Neal,

159 Idaho

447, 362 P.3d at

at

in this statute is t0 prevent dangerous, unsafe
into another lane

0f

trafﬁc.”).

inclement weather or

a

when

geared toward ensuring
(“The
522
evil t0 be remedied

of reference that

The fog

movement

is

out 0f a lane 0f trafﬁc and

line is especially useful

when

driving in

driving conditions are otherwise adverse. Merely that

temporarily touches 0r crosses the fog line will not by itselfgive rise t0 a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that section 49-637(1) has been violated. T0 be
tire

sure, driving onto 0r across the

fog

line

may be

considered when evaluating

whether an overall pattern 0f erratic 0r unsafe driving give rise t0 a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that section 49-63 7(1) has been violated under the totality 0f
circumstances. But that suspicion must be based 0n

touching 0r brieﬂy crossing thefog

line.
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more than one

tire

temporarily

does

m,

163 Idaho at 590, 416 P.3d at 962 (emphasis added). Contrary to Leonard’s argument, even

an isolated touching or crossing of a fog

line

“may be considered When

evaluating whether an

overall pattern 0f erratic or unsafe driving give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that I.C.

§

49-637(1) has been violated under the totality of circumstances.” Li.
This case involves more than just an isolated instance Where Leonard’s vehicle crossed

over the fog

line.

Not only did Deputy Hyle

line twice (2/23/17 Tr., p.9, Ls. 1 8-24), there

testify that

he saw Leonard’s vehicle cross the fog

was snow 0n the

side ofthe road

(ﬂ St. EX. 2, 00:00—

01 :00, Unassigned_20170120_1 1_13_UC2_DrugSeizure_47308163.ts, Camera

0),

and, as the

m

deputy testiﬁed, Leonard’s vehicle was traveling over the 65 miles per hour speed limit (2/23/17
Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8).

acknowledgment

Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, buttressed
that a “fog line is especially useﬁJI

driving conditions are otherwise adverse,”

that Fuller’s driving pattern

was

— regardless of Whether the fog

erratic

line

When

driving in inclement weather or

Deputy Hyle had a reasonable,

When

articulable suspicion,

and he was having difﬁculty maintaining

marked

by

his lane

of travel

the right side 0f his lane.

Because Leonard was speeding and drove over the fog

line twice,

under the totality ofthose

circumstances, Deputy Hyle had a reasonable, articulable suspicion t0 stop Leonard’s vehicle in
order t0 investigate his apparent inability t0 maintain his lane 0f travel

fog line technically deﬁnes one’s lane 0f travel.
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—

regardless 0f Whether a

CONCLUSION
The
motion

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

of Leonard’s

t0 suppress evidence.

DATED this 27th day of August, 2019.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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